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1958] RECENT CASES
. CRIMINAL LAW- CAPACITY TO COMMIT AND RESPONSIBIIITY FOR CRIME -
EXPERT TESTIMONY DRINKING BY ALCOHOLIC WAS DUE TO DISEASED MIND
ADMITTED As EVIDENCE. - The accused had been charged with driving an
automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and had been
freed on a surety bond. He did not appear in court at the time scheduled
for his trial, due to his being held in jail in another town because he had
again become intoxicated. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that evidence
of an expert witness that chronic alcoholism is a mental disease which causes
an unnatural craving for alcohol could not be disregarded in determining
whether or not an appearance bond should be forfeited. Wilder v. Oklahoma,
310 P.2d 765 (Okla. 1957).
The instant case is significant as the decision turns on the fact that the
court recognized medical testimony that an unnatural craving for alcohol
could be due to a diseased mind. In effect *the court recognized that the
drinking of intoxicating liquor by an alcoholic may under some circumstances
be an act which he cannot control, and the resulting intoxication may be
considered as involuntary. In 1883 Baron Park formulated the rule that
"voluntary drunkenness is no excuse for crime."1 In the dictum of the same
case he discussed the possibility of involuntary intoxication as a defense
for crime. Subsequently courts have recognized the theory of this defense,*-'
but involuntary intoxication has rarely if ever been successfully used in de-
fense of a crime.3 The courts have strictly adhered to the rule that drunken-
ness is primarily a vice4 and defenses that liquor may have been taken due to
an unnatural craving induced by a disease or injury of the brain have been
rejected.5
The courts have recognized the incompetence of the chronic alcoholic by
upholding statutes providing for the commitment of a drunkard without a
trial by jury.6 These commitments are of a paternal rather than a penal
nature.7 A North Dakota statute provides for the voluntary admission of
alcoholics to the State Hospital for the Insane.8
1. Pearson's Case, 2 Lewv. CC. 144, 168 Eng. Rep. 1108 (N.P. 1835).
2. Proctor v. United States, 177 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Long v. Commonwealth,
262 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1953); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 524, 115 S.E. 673
(1923).
3. Note, 11 Ark. L. Rev. 160 (1950); Hall, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility,
57 Hare. L. Rev. 1045 (1944).
4. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 524, 115 S.E. 673 (1923). "Drunkenness
has always been recognized as a vice, and the reason most usually assigned for the rule
that it does not excuse crimes is that no one may be allowed to expose the public to
the danger of harm or violence caused by his own misconduct in voluntarily rendering
himself dangerous."
5. Burrows v. Arizona, 38 Ariz. 99, 297 Pac. 1029 (1931); Choice v. Georgia, 31 Ga.
424 (1860); Uptone v. Illinois, 109 111. 169 (1883).
6. Ex parte Ligget, 187 Cal. 428, 202 Pac. 660 (1921); Ex parte Noble,' 53 Idaho 211,
22 P.2d 873 (1933).
7. Ex parte Hinkle, 33 Idaho 605, 196 Pac. 1035 (1921); Leavitt v. City of Morris,
105 Minn. 170, 117 N.W. 393, 395 (1908). "The trend, however, of legislation is to
treat habitual drunkenness as a disease of mind and body, analogous to insanity, and to
put in motion the power of the state, as the guardian of all its citizens to save the
inebriate, his family and society from the dire consequences of his pernicious habit. The
statute here under consideration is of such character. It is not a penal, but a paternal
statute, seeking not the punishment of the inebriate, but the safeguarding of his 4nterests
and the safety of the public by treating him as what he is in fact, a man of unsound :nind,
and placing him under the guardianship of the state to the end that he may be healed of
his infirmity."
.8. N.D. Rev.. Code § § 25-0301 'to 25-0304 (1943) as amended by N.D. Sess. Laws
1957, c. 196, § 3.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Science has long recognized individual differences in the propensity to
develop a craving for alcohol because of physiological and psychological
factors.9 Inheritance is believed by some researchers to be a major factor, and
in recent years nutrition has been found to have a decided effect.10
Subsequent to the discussion in the instant case, Dr. Roger Williams
reported that his research indicates alcoholism is primarily caused by mal-
nourishment of the hypothalamus, part of the mass of gray matter at the
base of the brain, which regulates human appetites and cravings.1 1 He also
states that research indicates a test which will determine the propensity of
a child to become an alcoholic as an adult. If the results of this test indicate
the child will later in life be highly susceptible to a craving for alcohol,
this condition may be remedied by supplying the growing child with the
proper nutrients.
Much* knowledge of alcoholism is available today that was not known at
the time the rules governing intoxication were formulated. If the courts
consider all available information on the problem when making their decisions,
it is likely that in the future there will be a trend in the courts to recognize
alcoholism as a disease for which the afflicted person should receive treatment,
rather than as a vice for which he should be punished.
MERVIN A. TUNTLAND
DAMAGES - Loss OF FUTURE EARNING POWER - DUTY OF COURT TO IN-
STRUCT JURY TO REDUCE LOSS OF FUTURE EARNINGS TO PRESENT WO-ITH. -
Plaintiff brought action for injuries sustained in an automobile collision 'n
Nebraska. The trial court instrncted if the jury found for the plantiff the loss
of future earning power might be -included in the items to be listed as
damages.1 The trial court did not instrnct the jury that the loss of future
earning power should be reduced to its present value; this instruction was not
requested. A verdict of $8,000.00 was rendered for the plaintiff. The Nebraska
Supreme Court, two justices dissenting, held that it was not reversible error
for the trial court to fail to instruct that damages due to the loss of future
earnings should be reduced to their present worth when no instruction to
that effect had been requested. Wolfe v. Mendel, 84 N.W.2d 109 (Neb. 1957).
It is generally agreed that some instruction should be given regarding the
reduction of damages for loss of future earning power to its present worth.-
Many of the courts feel that the absence of such instruction is not reversible
9. The Craving for Alcohol, A Symposium of World Health Expert Committees on
Mental Health and Alcohol, Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol,'March 1955, p. 34.
10. Williams, The Genetrophic Concept, Nutritional Deficiencies and Alcoholis:,I, Vol. 57
Annals of New York Academy of Science, (1953-1954) p. 794.
11. Fiddler's Dreams, Presidential Address of Dr. Roger Williams, 132nd Meeting of the
American Chemical Society, Chemical Engineering News, Sept. 16, 1957, p. 116. Dr.
Williams is director of the Biochemical Institute of Texas and president of the American
Chemical Society.
1. The jury was instructed to award an amount that would reasonably compensate
for damages sustained as a proximate cause of the accident.
2. See, e.g., Chicago & N.W. By. Co. v. Ott, 33 Wyo. 200, 237 Pac. 238 (1925).
See Miller, Assessment of Damages in Personal Injury Actions, 14 Minn. L. Rev. 216
(1930). See also Restatement, Torts § 924 comment d (1939).
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